Air Defence System of Pakistan ( Suggestions )

Columnist Syed Imran Shah suggests high-tech modernisation.

INTRODUCTION

The dominant role of air power in modern warfare has been clearly established. A nation unable to defend itself against air assaults of its adversary would be placed at a serious disadvantage in any future conflict. Air defence especially for nations under threat of military aggression thus becomes a vital element in its overall defence strategy.
India has a potent air power strike element that poses a serious threat to the security of Pakistan in any armed conflict. To be able to employ this offensive potential, the Indian Air Force would first have to overcome and degrade Pakistan’s air defence network. A strong and resilient air defence system then becomes imperative for Pakistan in order to prevent the Indian juggernaut. This article will address the air defence issues in general with special focus on Pakistan.

BACKGROUND
To carry out effective strike missions against targets defended by complex air defence systems a special mission was designed, called Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD/DEAD). Some specially modified aircraft were used for these missions, which were called Wild Weasels in the United States Air Force. These warplanes have special equipment for the detection of enemy radar stations and special missiles for knocking out these radars, called anti-radiation missiles (ARMs). The first of this kind was F-100 Super Sabre and later F-105 Thunder Chief armed with AGM-45 Shrike anti-radiation missiles, used in the Vietnam War. In the Operation Desert Storm in 1991, USAF used its F-4G Wild Weasels in SEAD role and they played an important role in the destruction of integrated air defences of Iraq. In Afghanistan, during Operation Enduring Freedom, the annihilation of the Taliban’s air defence network by SEAD missions permitted the use of the huge B-52 bombers and AC-130s to carry out devastating aerial attacks with impunity.
It was the growing threat of SAMs (Surface-to-air missiles) and sophisticated gun systems that caused the development of Stealth Technology. Stealth Technology is basically used to avoid radar detection without flying at low-level and thus escape many air defence systems. In Operation Desert Storm in 1991, USAF used its stealthy F-117 Night Hawks in the first strikes against the heavily defended targets in Baghdad. The F-22 Raptor is a stealth fighter, therefore, all of the weapons are carried internally in the weapon bay to minimize the range from which it can be detected. But it also has the external stores option, which can be exercised once enemy air defences are suppressed and there are no high stealth requirements. So, the heavy blow comes after the destruction of the air defences.
In order to carry out an effective interdiction mission, air defences of enemy have to be knocked out. On the other hand, for the defenders, to avoid devastation of national assets, air defence must be impregnable. Also, any nuclear strike will certainly be easy against the country whose air defences or ballistic missile defences are relatively weaker.

The EW & Arm Threat
Suppression of enemy air defences is carried out either by hard kill method or soft kill method. Hard kill means actual destruction of anti-aircraft defences and soft kill means jamming or disabling the surveillance and fire control radars for a particular time-period so that a strike formation can finish its job. For the hard kills, AGM-88 HARM (High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile) and other PGMs (Precision-Guided Munitions) are employed. For the soft kill, special EW (Electronic Warfare) planes are used. The EW planes used in Operation Desert Storm were EF-111 Ravens form USAF and EA-6B Prowlers from US Navy. These EW planes jammed the Iraqi radars and provided a safe corridor to the incoming strike formation. The EF-111s have been retired now. The EA-6 can also carry out HARM strikes against radars.
If a radar operator sees himself under attack of an anti-radar missile and shuts down the radar, even then a soft kill is achieved while attempting a hard kill. But the newer ARMs (other than AGM-45 Shrike like AGM-78 Standard, AGM-88 HARM, ALARM etc) remember the last location of the radar when it was emitting, and they continue their attack based on that last updated position of the SAM radar.
Israeli Air Force has also undertaken SEAD/DEAD missions on massive scale in the Yom Kippur war (1973) and Bekka Valley conflict (1982) in which 19 Syrian SAM sites were destroyed in a single day. In April 1986, the Libyan SA-5 Gammon long-range SAM was disabled by destroying its Square Pair radar by US planes firing ARMs.
CONSIDERATIONS FOR SAMs
An ARM basically destroys the emitting antenna of a radar unit, but the incoming strike formation can then destroy the remaining installations by cluster bomb attacks.
So the radars are prone to jamming and anti-radiation missile attacks and then there is no use of radar-guided Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) and radar-controlled AAA (Anti-Aircraft Artillery).
The Indian acquisition of Russian (Kh-25MP, Kh-59) and French (ARMAT) ARMs, and Israeli Harpy anti-radar drones coupled with IAI Malat Searcher 2 UAVs pose a serious threat to our air defence system. Hence, most of the SAMs defending the strategic assets must have multiple guidance methods, e.g., they should have at least two more guidance sensor like Electro-Optical, Laser, FLIR (Forward Looking Infra Red), IIR (Imaging Infra Red) etc in addition to engagement radar to impart them all-weather 24hr capability.
The Crotale NG SHORAD (Short Range Air Defence System) also features this approach and has multiple sensors like radar, FLIR and CCD TV. Both the surveillance and engagement radars of the Crotale NG are frequency-agile. The laser guidance is difficult to jam like CCD TV and IIR seekers. Laser guidance is available in short-range SAMs like Shorts Starburst and ADATS. Laser guided SHORAD systems should be made available to form MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defence System) and DETPADS (Detachment Portable AD System) around key points. The laser guidance allows the SAM to engage intruders at more head on range than simple IR-guided systems. TV-guidance allows engagement of targets at even lower levels than that is possible through radar guidance.
Long-range SAMs have no other option but to be guided by radars. They can be fooled in their final approach by ECMs (Electronic Counter Measures) like jammer, chaff, flare or other decoys, so these radars must feature ECCMs (Electronic Counter Counter Measures) like algorithms of AMRAAM’s radar to reject chaff and other decoys and to engage the correct target.
The MANPADS should be equipped with night sights to enable them to be used at night. Infrared (IR) guided missiles with Imaging IR (IIR) seekers are also difficult to counter because they can even select the part of aircraft to hit from its thermal image.
A SAM-based air defence system consists of surveillance radar for the detection of intruders and engagement radar for missile guidance. The surveillance radar (which is usually long-range) is difficult to replace with another sensor, but should be made resistant against jamming efforts. It should feature high frequency-agility and all possible ECMs (like operating on multiple frequencies at the same time) to make jamming difficult and keep it functioning. Our 35mm GDF-series Oerlikon AD guns should be upgraded to fire the AHEAD round, which will increase their lethality and SSKP (Single Shot Kill Probability).

DEALING WITH LOW LEVEL AIR THREAT
If the attack formation comes at a very low-level (about 100 feet), like the Jaguars of IAF, to avoid radar-detection and follow it up with a typical pop-up manoeuvre over the target, then the only time to engage them would be during their pop up phase when they will be pulling up in order to acquire the target and deliver their weapons load. During the pull-up, they will try to get a radar lock of the target, and this will be a time to get a lock on them and fire the SAM before they can release their payloads in the following dive.
With the availability of retarded bombs, this pop up phase has been considerably reduced thereby making it harder for the SAMs to achieve a lock on for successful engagement. AAA, with its inherent limitations would then be the only option with the defenders to intercept the raiders before weapons release phase.
To detect low-level intruders, the best solution is AWACS (Air Borne Warning And Control System). Today, we have many AWACS platforms available in the market other than US E-2 Hawkeye and E-3 Sentry, like Erieye radar on EMB-145. India is also trying to purchase the Israeli Phalcon AEW system and install it on IL-76 aircraft. This capability will be a force multiplier and greatly assist in not only their air defence effort but also their interdiction missions over Pakistan. The Indian raiders would get timely warning of any interceptors during the strike phase thus permitting them various defensive options to avoid getting intercepted. In the air defence role, after the Indian acquisition of AWACS, PAF’s strike formations would be unable to avoid detection even while flying at very low levels. This would seriously compromise its offensive potential.


STANDOFF WEAPONS
Today, the range of standoff Air-to-Surface weapons is on the increase and if the range of an AGM (air-to-ground missile) is more than the engagement range of a SAM, then the SAM site can be easily targeted, if no air cover is provided. With the standoff air-to-ground weapons, the pilot needs not to over fly the target and thus avoid its short-range air defences. So, the counter can be a long-range SAM belt around strategic assets or at least air force fighters should be provided with the best available BVR missiles (which in turn requires a modern long-range airborne radar to operate, even if it has active-radar guidance).
Indian Jaguars have the AS-30L missile, which give them the ability to target Air Defence sites in addition to other targets. Mirage 2000Hs, Jaguars and Mig-27s have been equipped with Rafael Litening targeting pods to deliver LGBs (Laser Guided Bombs) at standoff ranges of up to 64.8km and from a max altitude of 40,000 feet. Thus Litening allows them to avoid the VSHORAD (up to 4km) and SHORAD (up to 10km) systems.
Similarly, PAF is equipped with AGM-65 Mavericks and LGBs (with Atlis pod) and can use them in a number of ways. But this does not mean that they will always attack from standoff ranges. The possibility may be that they will try to destroy the air defences from a standoff range using ARMs, AGMs and LGBs and then carry out interdiction missions of over flying the targets, on the pattern of Israeli Air Force.
Litening Pod also allows Mirage 2000Hs, Jaguars and Mig-27s to undertake night strike missions over Pakistan through FLIR (Forward-looking Infra red). At night manned AAA will also be not effective and the range of the airborne radars (especially where ground radar cover is not available) will limit the operation of hostile interceptors, which is about 39km in Griffo-7 radars in F-7s and upgraded Mirages. Here the long-range radar of F-16s may work.
AIR DEFENCE FIGHTERS
PAF’s F-7s are a Chinese copy of Ex-Soviet Mig-21 Fishbed, which also forms the backbone of Indian air defence. Therefore, F-7s must match the performance of the upgraded Mig-21bis, called Mig-21-93. The upgraded Mig-21 also features BVR capability in the form of R-77 (AA-12 Adder), which is equivalent to AIM-120 AMRAAM.
The F-16s are considered air warriors of Pakistan, so they must be upgraded on the style of MLU (Mid-Life Upgrade) if possible. These fighters rely on Sidewinders (AIM-9L, P) and must be equipped with some latest 4th generation WVR (Within Visual Range) AAM having at least 70-60 degree off-bore sight engagement capability as IAF has R-73 (AA-11, Archer) missile which has off-bore sight capability along with an impressive range. If the acquisition of AIM-9X is not possible then the possibility of integrating A-Darter or ASRAAM or Mica with F-16s, F-7s and Mirages should be investigated.

THE ROLE OF BVR AAM

The detection range of the surveillance radars is always more than the range of Anti-radar missiles or Air-to-Surface Missiles. This can be used to an advantage in the way that friendly fighters on CAP (Combat Air Patrol) or ADA (Air Defence Alert) be instantly vectored towards the general heading of the enemy formation to intercept them well before the launch range of their weapons or the operating range of their jamming equipment. This means that enemy strike formation should be intercepted at least 50km away from target and any enemy fighter/attacker going beyond this should be engaged on priority basis. Some methods should be devised for identification at long distances, so that IFF (Identification of Friend or Foe) is not a problem and ROE (Rules of Engagement) can be relaxed. Here it becomes necessary to have fighter jets equipped with BVR (Beyond Visual Range) AAMs (Air-to-Air Missiles) of at least 35-30 km range to intercept enemy attack formation head on at a maximum safe distance from a strategic or tactical asset.
With the active-radar guided BVR missiles, our fighters will also be able to shoot down very high-flying enemy jets like Mig-25 recce planes. This is a point where we cannot replace fighters by SAMs or other missiles.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE
The next important aspect of our air defence system is against Ballistic Missiles because our adversary has the short and long-range Ballistic Missiles and they will certainly be used in any possible future conflict. Here we shall not discuss a national missile defence umbrella on pattern of NMD programme of USA, but the point defence system or TMD (Theatre Missile Defence) protecting a strategic asset from Ballistic missile attacks, like the Patriot system, whose latest version PAC-3 has proved itself in tests.
The Ballistic Missile attacks can be very successful if there is no defence against them, like in our case. A Ballistic missile defence system may not be able to intercept all ballistic missiles fired upon a target but it is also very difficult to launch many ballistic missiles together on a single target due to many reasons.
No one can guarantee the safety of mobile Ballistic missile launchers.
During war, it will be the highest priority of PAF & IAF to search and destroy the mobile launchers of each other like it was the duty of F-16s and other strike aircraft during Operation Desert Storm with surveillance provided by recce planes, UAVs and satellites. The UAVs are capable of providing real-time surveillance. Therefore, air force planes may hunt some of the launchers. It will thus be very unwise both for India and Pakistan to bring many launchers together for launching a salvo of Ballistic missiles.
Out of the remaining launchers, it will be difficult to make about 10 or so missile launchers ready at the same time, due to technical and maintenance problems, keeping in view the complex nature of a ballistic missile. Sometimes the situation may not permit to erect and launch a missile, such as air attack or unfavourable weather conditions.
At last, if one or two missiles are fired on a target, which is defended by a modern ATBM system, then these missiles can be intercepted. These are the reasons that many countries are pursuing ABM systems.

FUTURE PLANS FOR ABM DEFENCE
India is acquiring Russian and Israeli ATBM (Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile) systems like Antey-2500, which is an improved version of S-300V system. It is effective against Ballistic Missiles of ranges up to 2,500 km with a velocity of up to 4.5 km/s. Antey-2500 missiles will be integrated with Israeli Elta Green Pine radars. India has already leased S-300PMU for training purposes. It is also pursuing its own SAM system called Akash with Rajendra radar. Although many tests of the system failed but the programme is still under development. China has also acquired S-300 system from Russia and is working on several SAM systems.
Iran modified the US supplied HAWK SAM for air-to-air role on its F-14 Tomcats. We can also launch our own programme with help from China. Another possibility may be that Pakistan, Iran and China should start a joint ATBM project.
The NESCOM setup can pursue a project in collaboration with the above friendly countries to develop a medium to long-range SAM system (which includes the missile itself and associated radars) capable of intercepting both the air-breathing targets and Ballistic Missiles. Its detection range must be at least 300 kms and engagement range of at least 50-40 km. The SAM system should fire two types of missiles, one for long-to-medium range engagements and other for medium-to-short range engagements, with overlapping region in between.ECCM features must be incorporated right into the design. A start can be taken by designing a medium-range SAM system only against air-breathing targets
(aircraft and cruise missiles).
USA, Russia and Israel are all working on ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) systems. US is pursuing ABL (Air-Borne laser), THAAD (Theatre High Altitude AD) etc, Israel is pursuing Arrow programme and lastly comes the ultimate S-400 multi-layered, multi-missile air defence system of Russia. In future, India may acquire these systems from aforesaid countries but Pakistan may not be able to do so.Therefore, to maintain a balance of power and a strong air defence, we shall have to do it ourselves.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
The author is a Mechanical Engineer and graduate in International Relations & Economics with deep interest in military technology, operations and history.

Pakistan Missile Technology , List of missiles by Pakistan Army

                                                                 Pakistan Missile Technology

                                                       ABDALI MISSILE SERIES

 1. Abdali I

Range: 100 Km
Operational Capability: 100% operational

2. Abdali II

Range: 180 Km
Operational Capability: 100% operational

                                                   GHAZNAVI MISSILE SERIES

Ghaznavi

Range: 290 Km
Operational Capability: 100% operational



                                                              M-11 Missile

Range: 700 Km
Operational Capability: 100% operational


                                                  GHAURI MISSILE SERIES
 
1. Ghauri I
 
Range: 1500 Km
Operational Capability: 100% operational


2. Ghauri II
 
Range: 2300 Km
Operational Capability: 100% operational


3. Ghauri III
 
Range: 3500 Km
Operational Capability: Not Operational
 
                                                  SHAHEEN MISSILE SERIES
 
1. Shaheen I
 
Range: 750 Km
Operational Capability: 100% operational


2. Shaheen II
 
Range: 2500 Km
Operational Capability: 100% operational


3.Shaheen III
 
Range: 4000 Km
Operational Capability: Not Operational
 
                                                         Ra'ad Missile
 
Range: 350 Km
Operational Capability: 100% operational


                                         BABAR MISSILE SERIES
 
1. Babar I
 
Range: 700 Km
Operational Capability: 100% operational


2. Babar II
 
Range : 880 Km
Operational Capability: 100% operational


3. Babar III
 
Range : 1500 Km
Status : Under Development
 
PLEASE IMPROVE THIS ARTICLE BY ADDING SOME COMMENTS TO TELL ME WHAT I HAVE MISSED. THANKS

Pakistan Infantary Weapons: Sub Machine Gun SMG-PK, PK1

SMG PK is one of the most reliable & compact sub-machine guns in production at the Pakistan Ordnance Factories. Based on the Famous H&K delayed roller locked blowback system, this 9mm sub-machine gun can be employed for Close Quarter Battle (CQB) and is popular among para medics, military personnel, signal personnel, para jumpers, SSG officers on special duty, military police and civil law enforcing agencies. SMG-PK presents complete versatility and mobility coupled with the punching power of 9mm Para.

These SMGs come with universal carrying sling, spare magazines and option accessories.

Calibre: 9 x 19 mm Para
Feed Device: 15 Rounds Magazine
Type of Fire: Single & Automatic
Rate of Fire: 900 RPM
Muzzle Velocity: 375 m/sec
Sights: Rigid Front Sight & Rotary Rear Sight
Length of Weapon: 340 mm
Length of Barrel: 115 mm
Weight of Weapon: 2.0 kg


SMG PK-1
SMG PK-1 is also available with retractable butt stock and a standard pistol grip.

Top research programs of Pakistan Military. Pakistan Army future weapons

Here are the top research programs of Pakistan Military.

1. Aircraft and Missile Defence System ( P-AMDS)
2. Pakistan Super Air Force ( New concept in the world )
3. Military Robotics
4. Yeod Weapons
5. Yeod Missile Program
6. Turbo Sheild

I have got the list of some projects after so much research. Soon I will try to explain about these projects after some confirmations. Morever, I will try to find out what are other projects of Pakistan Military.

Working of Anti-Air guided Missiles

You are interested to know how an anti-aircraft missile works. If it is really then I am going to tell you something that would be really very informative for you. I am going to tell you the basics of working of such kind of missiles. They maybe of following types.

1. Radar Guided
2. Infrared Guided
3. Electro Optical
4. Passive Anti-Radiation

1. Radar Guided

                               Radar guided missiles work on the principle of detecting target's radar signals. They are classified in following ways.

(a) Active radar homing
Active radar (AR)-guided missiles carry their own radar system to detect and track their target. However, the size of the radar antenna is limited by the small diameter of missiles, limiting its range which typically means such missiles have to use two methods to get close to the target before turning their radar set on, often relying on guidance systems.

They have many advantages as well as disadvantages.

Advantages

There are two major advantages to active radar homing:

Because the missile is tracking the target, and the missile is typically going to be much closer to the target than the launching platform during the terminal phase, the tracking can be much more accurate and also have better resistance to ECM. Active radar homing missiles have some of the best kill probabilities, along with missiles employing track-via-missile guidance.
Because the missile is totally autonomous during the terminal phase, the launch platform does not need to have its radar enabled at all during this phase, and in the case of a mobile launching platform like an aircraft, can actually exit the scene or undertake other actions while the missile homes in on its target. This is often referred to as fire-and-forget capability and is a great advantage that modern air-to-air missiles have over their predecessors.

Disadvantages

There are two major disadvantages to active radar homing:

Since the missile has to contain an entire radar transceiver and electronics, it was until recently difficult to fit all of this into a missile without unacceptably increasing its size and weight. Even with today's miniaturisation making this possible, it is quite expensive to make these missiles since the sophisticated electronics within the missile are inevitably destroyed upon impact.
There is very little chance that targets with any sort of decent radar warning receiver would be unaware that an incoming missile is approaching them. This gives them sufficient time to take evasive action and deploy countermeasures. However, given the accuracy of this homing method, unless the target is especially maneuverable or the missile is not, there may not be much they can do to avoid being intercepted.
These types of missiles with this mounted equipment are only effective in long range confrontations.

(b) Semi-active radar homing

Semi-active radar (SAR)-guided missiles are simpler and more common. They function by detecting the radar energy reflected from the target, the radar energy is emitted from the launch aircraft's own radar signal. However, this means the launch aircraft has to maintain a “lock” on the target (keep illuminating the target aircraft with its own radar) until the missile makes the interception, limiting the attacking aircraft's ability to maneuver, which may be necessary should threats to the attacking aircraft appear. It also makes jamming the missile lock easier because the launching aircraft is further from the target than the missile, so the radar signal has to travel further and is greatly attenuated over the distance.
The basic concept of SARH is that since almost all detection and tracking systems consist of a radar system, duplicating this hardware on the missile itself is redundant. In addition, the resolution of a radar is strongly related to the physical size of the antenna, and in the small nose cone of a missile there isn't enough room to provide the sort of accuracy needed for guidance. Instead the larger radar dish on the ground or launch aircraft will provide the needed signal and tracking logic, and the missile simply has to listen to the signal reflected from the target and point itself in the right direction. Additionally, the missile will listen rearward to the launch platform's transmitted signal as a reference, enabling it to avoid some kinds of radar jamming distractions offered by the target.

Contrast this with beam riding systems, in which the radar is pointed at the target and the missile keeps itself centered in the beam by listening to the signal at the rear of the missile body. In the SARH system the missile listens for the reflected signal at the nose, and is still responsible for providing some sort of “lead” guidance. The disadvantages are twofold: One is that a radar signal is “fan shaped”, growing larger, and therefore less accurate, with distance. This means that the beam riding system is not accurate at long ranges, while SARH is largely independent of range and grows more accurate as it approaches the target, or the source of the reflected signal it listens for. Another requirement is that a beam riding system must accurately track the target at high speeds, typically requiring one radar for tracking and another “tighter” beam for guidance. The SARH system needs only one radar set to a wider pattern.

Beam Riding

An early form of radar guidance was “beam-riding” (BR). In this method the attacking aircraft directed a narrow beam of radar energy at the target. The air-to-air missile was launched into the beam where sensors on the aft of the missile controlled the missile, keeping it within the beam. So long as the beam was kept on the target aircraft, the missile would ride the beam until making the interception. While simple in concept, the difficulty of simultaneously keeping the beam solidly on the target (which couldn't be relied upon to cooperate by flying straight and level), continuing to fly one's own aircraft, all the while keeping an eye out for enemy countermeasures, can be readily appreciated.

2. Infrared Guidence

Infrared guided (IR) missiles home on the heat produced by an aircraft. Early infra-red detectors had poor sensitivity, so could only track the hot exhaust pipes of an aircraft. This meant an attacking aircraft had to maneuver to a position behind its target before it could fire an infra-red guided missile. This also limited the range of the missile as the infra-red signature soon become too small to detect with increasing distance and after launch the missile was playing “catch-up” with its target.

More modern infra-red guided missiles can detect the heat of an aircraft's skin, warmed by the friction of airflow, in addition to the fainter heat signature of the engine when the aircraft is seen from the side or head-on. This, combined with greater maneuverability, gives them an “all-aspect” capability, and an attacking aircraft no longer had to be behind its target to fire. Although launching from behind the target increases the probability of a hit, the launching aircraft usually has to be closer to the target in a tail-chase engagement.

An aircraft can defend against infra-red missiles by dropping flares that are hotter than the aircraft, so the missile homes in on the brighter, hotter target. Towed decoys and infra-red jammers can also be used. Some large aircraft and many combat helicopters make use of so called "hot brick" infra-red jammers, typically mounted near the engines. Current research is developing laser devices which can spoof or destroy the guidance systems of infra-red guided missiles.

However, the latest missiles such as the ASRAAM use an “imaging” infra-red seeker which “sees” the target (much like a digital video camera), and can distinguish between an aircraft and a point heat source such as a flare. They also feature a very wide detection angle, so the attacking aircraft does not have to be pointing straight at the target for the missile to lock on. The pilot can use a helmet mounted sight (HMS) and target another aircraft by looking at it, and then firing. This is called “off-boresight” launch. For example, the Russian Su-27 is equipped with an infra-red search and track (IRST) system with laser rangefinder for its HMS-aimed missiles.

In order to maneuver sufficiently from a poor launch angle at short ranges to hit its target, missiles are now employing gas-dynamic flight control methods such as vectored thrust, which allow the missile to start turning “off the rail”, before its motor has accelerated it up to high enough speeds for its small aerodynamic surfaces to be useful.

3. Electro Optical

A recent advancement in missile guidance is electro-optical imaging. The Israeli Python-5 has an electro-optical seeker that scans designated area for targets via optical imaging. Once a target is acquired, the missile will lock-on to it for the kill. Electro-optical seekers can be programmed to target vital area of an aircraft, such as the cockpit. Since it does not depend on the target aircraft's heat signature, it can be used against low-heat targets such as UAV's and cruise missiles.

However clouds can get in the way of electro-optical sensors.

4. Passive Anti-Radiation

Evolving missile guidance designs are converting the anti-radiation missile (ARM) design, pioneered during Vietnam and used to home in against emitting surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, to an air intercept weapon. Passive missile development is thought to be a countermeasure to low-observable stealth aircraft which typically mount powerful air intercept radars. Due to their dependence on target aircraft radar emissions, passive anti-radiation missiles are primarily limited to forward-aspect intercept geometry.

Pakistan Army Anti-Terror Swat and S.S.G commandos Weapon POF Eye

POF Eye is an advanced weapon developed by Pakistan Ordnance Factory. It is specially designed for anti-terror operations. It will be used by Pakistan swat forces and commandos. It has many unique features not available in other advanced guns. It is equipped with cameras for better aim. It works as SMG,Gernade Launcher and a pistol at same time. It is highly advanced weapon developed by Pakistani scientists.It allows its operator to both see and attack an armed target without exposing the operator to counter-attack. Now Pakistani swat forces will be able to attack at any target without so much difficulity. For a full overview of this gun watch this video.

List of Missiles contained by Pakistan Army and Defence Forces 2010 Part 1

Part 1

Surface to Surface Missiles

1. Battlefield range ballistic missiles (BRBM)

(a)Abdali-I

Operational Range : 180 km

(b)Hatf-I

Operational Range:Hatf-I: 70 km, Hatf-IA/IB: 100 km

2. Short Range Ballistic Missiles ( SRBM )

(a) Ghaznavi

Operational Range : 290 km

3. Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM)

(a) Ghauri I

Operational Range : 1500 km

(b) Shaheen I

Operational Range : 650km

(c) Ghauri II

Operational Range : 2000km( with 1200 Kg Payload) , 2500km ( with 750 Kg pay load)

For More Missiles wait for Part 2

Steyr AUG of SSG commandos of Pakistan Army

The rifle features a two-stage trigger (pulling the trigger halfway produces semi-automatic fire, pulling the trigger all the way to the rear produces fully automatic fire) and a safety mechanism (cross-bolt, button type), located immediately above the hand grip. In its “safe” position (white dot) the trigger is mechanically disabled; pressing the safety button to the left exposes a red dot and indicates the weapon is ready to fire. Some versions have an ALO or "automatic lockout", a small projection at the base of the trigger. This was first included on the Irish Defence Forces variant of the rifle, and soon after, the Australian Defence Forces variant. In the exposed position the ALO stops the trigger being squeezed past the semi-automatic position. If needed, the ALO can be pushed up to permit automatic fire.

The rifle is fed from translucent, double-column box magazines (molded from a high-strength polymer) with a 30-round capacity and an empty weight of 130 g (4.6 oz). The light machine gun version of the AUG uses an extended 42-round magazine.

Integrated with the receiver casting is a fixed carry handle that contains a 1.5x telescopic sight made by Swarovski Optik. It contains a simple black ring reticle with a basic rangefinder that is designed so that at 300 m (984.3 ft) a 180 cm (5 ft 10.9 in) tall man-size target will completely fill (subtend) it, giving the shooter a relatively accurate method of estimating range. The sight cannot be set to a specific range but can be adjusted for windage and elevation for an initial zero and is designed to be calibrated for 300 m. When so set, aiming at the centre of a target will produce a hit at all ranges out to 300m. The rifle also has a back-up iron sight with a rear notch and front blade, cast into the top of the aluminum optical sight housing, used in case of failure or damage to the primary optical sight. The sight is also equipped with a set of three illuminated dots (one on the front blade and two at the rear) for use in low-level lighting conditions. In order to mount a wide range of optics and accessories, a receiver with a NATO-standard Picatinny rail and detachable carry handle was also developed and introduced in 1997.

Three-pronged, open-type flash suppressors were used on the 350 mm (13.8 in), 407 mm (16.0 in) and 508 mm (20.0 in) length barrels, whereas the 621 mm (24.4 in) light machine gun barrel received a closed-type ported muzzle device (combination flash suppressor and compensator) and an integral, lightweight folding bipod. The flash suppressors are screwed to the muzzle and internally threaded to take a blank-firing attachment.

The rifle comes standard with four magazines, a muzzle cap, spare bolt for left-handed shooters, blank-firing adaptor, cleaning kit, sling and either an American M7 or Austrian KCB bayonet.